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THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL DISORDER IN CRIME: 
A SURVEY* 
One of the consequences of the law's acceptance of the lay notion 
that most people are free rational agents is the tacit assumption that ex- 
cept in clearly recognizable cases of marked dementia, all people are the 
same and should be treated alike. No middle zone is recognized.1 This 
approach to the problem of anti-social behavior is, of course, completely 
opposed to the present trend of thought. To the criminologist mental 
abnormality is an extremely broad concept; and is merely one of the 
factors to be considered in determining in individual cases why an of- 
fender offended and what method of treatment would be most effective 
in protecting society against a repetition of such behavior. But the law 
could not adopt such a view and still continue to exist as it is classically 
envisaged. Law is general; rules are framed in advance and are applied 
to all equally. An inquiry into the causes of behavior for the purpose 
of determining a legal result would make each case unique. There 
could be no law.2 
A concession, however, has been made in the case of marked de- 
mentia, for the early punitive philosophy of criminal law did not demand 
the punishment of people who had not the ability to control their be- 
havior or comprehend its consequences. The desire for vengeance was 
not thwarted if offenders commonly regarded as demented were left 
untouched. But the very basis of the exception was the idea that 
people were of one type or the other, either sane or insane. At a time 
when mental abnormality was explained in terms of the effects of lunar 
rays, and even later (in the first part of the nineteenth century) when 
phrenology was respectable and in high vogue, it was inevitable that 
this simple categorization should have evolved. Psychology and psy- 
chiatry were not yet born when the law's present attitude toward the 
* I am indebted to Mr. Philip Levy of the editorial board of the COLUMBIA 
LAW REVIEW for his assistance in the preparation of this paper. 
1See B. GLUECK, PSYCHIATRIC AIMS IN THE FIELD OF CRIMINOLOGY (Nat. 
Corn. for Mental Hygiene, 1922). 
2See S. Glueck, New Trends in Criminology, in (1924) CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL 
WORK. 
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problem of mental abnormality crystallized. Ordinary rules of law and 
procedure were regarded as being as well adapted for determining the 
existence of the particular condition of the mind termed insanity as for 
determining the existence of the operative facts in assault and battery. 
The matter was one capable of being handled competently by laymen. 
If the law were malleable and easily changed to fit newly acquired 
knowledge, and if, in the past, those engaged in different professions 
were accustomed to exchange views to their mutual profit, the notorious 
condition now existing in this branch of the law would probably have 
been avoided. But the law is rigid, precedent is a stiffening element, 
and the professions have not been in the habit of exchanging views. 
Hence the law still clings to its early naive notion in regard to the 
mental springs of human conduct, heedless of the fact that medical 
science has demonstrated that the lay tests devised by the law are hope- 
lessly inadequate for the purpose of detecting mental abnormality. To 
the psychiatrist there is an almost endless variety of types of mental 
disorder. "Sanity" and "insanity" have been practically ejected from 
the medical vocabulary.3 
There is thus a conflict between the sweeping general approach of 
the law and the highly individualized approach of sociologists and psy- 
chiatrists,4 and it is toward the resolution of this conflict that effort 
should be directed. What means can be devised which will enable the 
law to utilize the knowledge of these branches of the sciences? 
One preliminary point should be noted here. If the sole criterion 
of the desirability of rules of law was the degree to which these rules 
reflected the opinions and desires of the community, the vast difference 
subsisting between the legal and medical attitudes toward mental ab- 
normality would not be conclusive proof that a radical change in the law 
was necessary. It is probable that the layman still conceives of offenders 
as being sane or insane and still demands that the sane be and the in- 
sane be not, held criminally responsible. The law to that extent reflects 
the psychological and ethical notions of the man on the street. But 
despite this consideration, there is still left the much more important 
problem of whether the rules and procedure adopted by the law are cal- 
3 
"Impulses, delusions, knowledge of right and wrong are no longer conceived 
as concrete entities that either are or are not. Man is not a mosaic which may have 
some portion of the pattern dropped out indifferently as it were. The language of the law, while it might have been all right a hundred or two years ago is no longer 
usable by the present-day psychiatrist who finds himself quite unequal to thinking in such terms and much less able to use them exclusively as he is required to on 
the witness stand, for the expression of his thoughts." WHITE, INSANITY AND THE 
CRIMINAL LAW (1923) 104. The fact is not overlooked that the various schools 
of thought in psychiatry and psychology differ to some extent inter se. 
4 S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1925) 188 et seq. 
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culated to protect society from the harmful acts of people suffering from 
mental disorder, whether such disorder amounts to "insanity" or not. 
In the ensuing criticism, this latter consideration is premised as the chief 
gauge of desirability.5 
HISTORY OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE6 
Until the late thirteenth century criminal responsibility was de- 
termined quite objectively. Lunacy was no defense. In the reign of 
Edward I it became a ground for royal pardon; physical punishment 
was thus avoided but the goods of the accused were nevertheless for- 
feited. Not until the first quarter of the fourteenth century was lunacy 
established as a defense.7 The law then adopted tests for the purpose of 
ascertaining the existence of this condition. The historical evolution of 
these tests is as random as the law itself. Stray phrases dropped in 
books and opinions were successively adopted as tests by commentators 
and courts. Thus Bracton, writing in the thirteenth century before 
lunacy was established as a defense in the courts, said that a madman 
(furiosus) is one who does not know what he is doing, who lacks in 
mind and reason, and who is not far removed from brutes.8 Coke sub- 
sumed the requirement of sanity for criminal responsibility under the 
general requirement of "guilty intent."9 Hale introduced the notion 
of partial insanity that was to cause so much trouble later, and also laid 
down the "child of fourteen" test as determining criminal irresponsi- 
bility in cases of total insanity.'0 Hawkins, writing late in the eight- 
eenth century, introduced the "good and evil" concept, the precursor 
of the famous "right and wrong" test." The courts, greatly influenced 
by these commentators, adopted now one, now another, and sometimes 
odd combinations of these tests.l2 In 1800, Lord Erskine, defending 
one Hadfield in a prosecution for shooting at the king, introduced a new 
element into the already highly disordered state of the law. Hadfield, 
according to modern psychiatrists, was a typical paranoiac suffering 
'See Sayre, Book Review (1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 520, 522. 6 For an exhaustive historical treatment, see WHARTON AND STILLE, MEDICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE (1873) 510 et seq. S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 123 et seq. 
See also, Sayre, Mens Rea (1932) 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1005. 
73 HOLDSWORTH, ISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1923) 312-316, 371-375. 
Holdsworth points out that this result was probably hastened by the fact that 
royal grace in such cases became a routine matter and that jurors returned verdicts 
of not guilty when they realized that application for a pardon had become a mere 
formality. 
8 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ANGLIAE, f. 150. 
Co. LITT. *247b. 
10 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1778) 30. 
1 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (8th ed. 1824) 2. 
12 The cases are collected and analyzed in S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 
139 et seq.; Mikell, M'Naghten's Case and Beyond (1902) 50 AM. L. REG. 264, 270. 
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from systematized delusions. Erskine eloquently pleaded that extreme 
cases where "the human mind is stormed in its citadel, and laid prostrate 
under the stroke of frenzy" are very rare, and that the true character 
of insanity is delusion. But he asserted that one should not be excused 
from criminal responsibility unless the delusion was "connected with 
the act.'13 His argument prevailed and became a landmark in the law 
of insanity. 
In 1843 the law was in a state of hopeless confusion. In that year, 
one M'Naghten, suffering from a mental disease which manifested it- 
self in what are now regarded as typical delusions of persecution, and 
believing himself to be hounded by Sir Robert Peel, shot and killed 
Peel's secretary, having mistaken him for Peel. He was tried, and ac- 
quitted on the ground of insanity.14 The case created great public furore 
and was the subject of debate in the House of Lords. It was finally 
determined to secure the opinion of the judges of the House of Lords 
on the law governing such cases. Accordingly four questions were 
asked which were answered by the Lords. It is interesting to note that 
though the answers to these questions were merely opinions of the 
judges and not decisive of any case before them, the particular type of 
mental abnormality that must have been in the minds of the judges 
was paranoia,-M'Naghten's trouble. 
Questions one and four and their respective answers, and ques- 
tions two and three and their respective answers will be considered to- 
gether for convenience. 
"Question One: What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by 
persons afflicted with insane delusion, in respect of one or more particular sub- 
jects or persons; as, for instance, where at the time of the commission of the 
alleged crime, the accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but did the 
act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of re- 
dressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some 
supposed public benefit? 
"Answer: Assuming that your Lordships' inquiries are confined to those 
persons who labour under such partial delusions only, and are not in other 
respects insane, we are of opinion that, notwithstanding the party accused did 
the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of re- 
dressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing 
some public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable according to the nature of 
the crime committed, if he knew at the time of committing such crime that he 
was acting contrary to law; by which expression we understand your Lord- 
ships to mean the law of the land. 
"Question Four: If a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts, 
commits an offense in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused? 
13 See Hadfield's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281, 1314 (1800). Extracts from this 
speech are reprinted in MEREDITH, INSANITY AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1931) 118. 4 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200 (1843). 
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"Answer: The answer must of course depend on the nature of the delu- 
sion; but, making the same assumption as we did before, namely, that he 
labours under such partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, 
we think he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if 
the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if 
under the influence of his delusion he supposes another man to be in the act 
of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes in 
self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that 
the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and 
he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to pun- 
ishment."l5 
The answers to these questions have been subjected to considerable 
discussion and criticism. Commentators, notably Sheldon Glueck, have 
pointed out that the answers proceed on the following erroneous as- 
sumptions: 
(1) That delusion is a disease instead of a symptom of some broad 
mental disease affecting the individual as a unit, and that a person suffer- 
ing from a delusion may be able to reason in a perfectly normal manner. 
Although this assumption is opposed to the knowledge of mental dis- 
order that has been accumulated in recent years, it was probably in 
accord with the medical opinion of its time.16 
(2) That a delusion is either visibly connected with the act in 
question or that it has no relation whatever to it, and that a layman is 
capable of discerning the connection.7 Psychiatrists tell us that acts 
which, even to the most imaginative of laymen, have no "connection" 
with the delusion in question, may be the inevitable outcome of the de- 
lusion.18 
(3) That the cognitive faculties are the sole criteria of mental- 
health and therefore of criminal responsibility. The answers of the 
judges to these questions "do not take account of the fact that the cogni- 
tive mode of mental life can hardly be said to be disturbed without this 
1510 Clark & F. at 209. 
16"Dr. Robert Darling Willis testified before a committee of the House of 
Commons in 1810 as follows: 'In insanity the mind if occupied upon some fixed 
assumed idea to the truth of which it will pertinaciously adhere in opposition to the 
plainest evidence of its falsity; and the individual is always acting under that false 
impression.' Writing in 1823, Dr. Francis Willis said: 'An unsound mind is 
marked by delusion.' An English barrister, writing in 1838, quotes Dr. Haslam as 
saying, 'False belief is the essential of insanity.' In M'Naghten's case, Dr. E. T. 
Mauro was asked, 'Is it consistent with the pathology of insanity that a partial 
delusion may exist, depriving the person of all self-control, whilst the other fac- 
ulties are sound?' (Answer) 'Certainly, monomania may exist with general san- 
ity.'" See Keedy, Criminal Responsibility (1921) 12 J. CRIM. L. 14, 23, 25. 
17 Note the effect of Erskine's plea in Hadfield's Case, supra note 13. 
18 See the many authorities collected in S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 302 
et seq. See also 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1883) 161. 
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also being an indication of the disturbed condition of the inseparable 
emotional-volitional life of the accused."19 
(4) That the two tests laid down are capable of being used prac- 
tically and of producing consistent results. In answering the first ques- 
tion, the judges stated that whether or not the delusion was a defense 
depended on the ability of the accused to know that what he did was 
contrary to the law. In answer to the fourth question, the delusion was 
stated to be an excuse if the facts erroneously imagined would have 
constituted an excuse had they really existed. Both answers really ap- 
plied to but one question, and that was, what should the law be in re- 
gard to the commission of crimes by people suffering from insane de- 
lusion. Yet the answers gave tests that were calculated to produce dif- 
ferent results in certain situations. Thus a man stated to be suffering 
from an insane delusion might very well, as far as the judgment of lay- 
men is concerned, be unable to know that what he was doing was con- 
trary to the law of the land, and hence under answer one, be excused. 
And yet he would be held responsible under answer four if the facts 
that the insane delusion caused him to believe were such as would not 
constitute a defense if they had been real. How a court should instruct 
a jury and what the jury should do under such circumstances is not in- 
dicated. Furthermore, even conceding that the two tests do not clash, 
they are couched in terms which are well calculated to make the results 
in many cases a matter of chance. 
Finally it may be said that these tests bear no relation to the needs 
that led to their creation. If it is assumed that the law of insanity 
should reflect the notions of society as to when mental abnormality 
should excuse one from criminal responsibility, certainly the answer to 
question four falls short of achieving that purpose. If the average lay- 
man believes that an individual is suffering from delusions of persecu- 
tion it is extremely doubtful that he would hold him responsible al- 
though the facts, if real, constitute no defense.20 If it is the chief 
purpose of the rules concerning criminal responsibility to insure the 
protection of society, the tests laid down in these answers have no 
relation to that purpose. There is no sound connection between the 
exoneration of persons who commit destructive acts while imagin- 
ing facts which, if real, would constitute a defense, and the neces- 
19 S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 172. 
20 
"It is probable no ingenuous student of the law ever read it for the first time 
without being shocked by its exquisite inhumanity. ... If he [the defendant] dare 
fail to reason, on the supposed facts embodied in the delusion, as perfectly as a 
sane man could do on a like state of realities, he receives no mercy at the hands of 
the law. ... It is not only opposed to the known facts of modern medical science, 
but it is a hard and unjust rule to be applied to the unfortunate and providential 
victims of disease." See State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 387 (1891). 
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sity so to dispose of persons suffering from mental disorder as to insure 
that they will not again injure society. Nor can it be said that the man- 
ner of treatment should be determined by the ability of the offender to 
know whether his act constituted an offense. Similarly, if tests of re- 
sponsibility should insure that offenders of a degree of mental abnor- 
mality falling short of the M'Naghten requirement but yet incapable of 
being deterred by punishment, will not be punished in the ordinary man- 
ner, it cannot be said that the tests laid down tend to accomplish that ob- 
jective. 
Questions two and three and their answers are as follows: 
"Question Two: What are the proper questions to be submitted to the 
jury, when a person alleged to be afflicted with insane delusion respecting one 
or more particular subjects or persons, is charged with the commission of a 
crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set up as a defence? 
"Question Three: In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury, 
as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time when the act was committed? 
"Answers: As these two questions appear to us to be more conveniently 
answered together, we have to submit our opinion to be that the jury ought to 
be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess 
a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary 
be proved to their satisfaction; and that, to establish a defence on the ground 
of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, 
the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of 
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or 
if he did know it that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. The 
mode of putting the latter part of the question to the jury on these occasions 
has generally been, whether the accused at the time of doing the act knew the 
difference between right and wrong; which mode, though rarely, if ever, lead- 
ing to any mistake with the jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate when put 
generally and in the abstract, as when put with reference to the party's knowl- 
edge of right and wrong in respect to the very act with which he is charged.' 
If the question were to be put as to the knowledge of the accused solely and 
exclusively with reference to the law of the land, it might tend to confound 
the jury by inducing them to believe that an actual knowledge of the law of 
the land was essential in order to lead to a conviction; whereas the law is ad- 
ministered on the principle that every one must be taken conclusively to know 
it, without proof that he does know it. If the accused was conscious that the 
act was one which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time 
contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable, and the usual course therefore 
has been to leave the question to the jury whether the accused had a sufficient 
degree of reason to know he was doing an act that was wrong; and this course 
we think is correct, accompanied with such observations and explanations 
as the circumstances of each case may require."2 
This answer firmly established the "right and wrong" test. Even 
though the mental disorder is conclusively proved to have compelled 
21 M'Naghten's Case, supra note 14, at 209. 
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the defendant to do what he did, he will nevertheless be convicted if 
twelve laymen are of the opinion that the defendant knew that what he 
did was wrong. No indication is given in the last answer as to the sense 
in which the words "right" and "wrong" were used, whether moral 
or legal. Though of slight practical importance, the obscurity of the 
opinion of the judges on this matter22 has occasionally caused diffi- 
culties.23 
The criticisms of the answers to questions one and four suggested 
above apply with equal force here. None of the implied or expressed 
purposes which the rules of criminal responsibility should be designed 
to further seem to be served by the "nature and quality of the act" and 
"right and wrong" tests. If simplicity and objectivity of rules are de- 
siderata in the law, it cannot be said that they are attained by the tests 
laid down in this answer. 
Despite the fact that the opinion of the judges has been widely 
criticized by commentators, it is the foundation upon which rests the 
present law dealing with the mentally disordered.24 It is a remarkable 
example of the inertia of legislatures and the rigidity of precedent. 
THE LAW IN THIS COUNTRY 
(1) The "right and wrotng' test. The "right and wrong" test is 
adopted in the great majority of jurisdictions, and in some states as 
the sole test.25 But as Sheldon Glueck points out, ". . . cases could 
be cited which would tend to prove that whatever may be the formal 
statement of existing tests of irresponsibility in the different states, 
2 In the answers to questions one and four, the judges made it clear that by 
'"ight and wrong" they were referring to the law of the land. In the answer to 
questions two and three, the judges refused to commit themselves as to whether juries were to be instructed to consider the law of the land. 
23 Cf. People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945 (1915); WHITE, op. cit. 
supra note 3, at 63; S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 221. 24 Some recent English cases are: Rex v. Kopsch, 19 Cr. App. R. 50 (1925); Rex v. Flavell, 19 Cr. App. R. 141 (1926); Rex v. True, discussed infra, note 48; 
see (1930) 169 L. T. 138. 2 There is an exhaustive collection of the authorities in S. GLUECK, op. cit. 
supra note 4, at 227 et seq; (1926) 44 A. L. R. 584. A survey of the more recent 
cases indicates no change in the inflexible rule. Cf., e.g., People v. Marquis, 344 Ill. 261, 176 N. E. 314 (1931); Wilson v. State, 120 Neb. 468, 233 N. W. 461 (1930); State v. George, 158 Atl. 509 (N. J. 1932); People v. Lizarraga, 108 Cal. App. 152, 291 Pac. 434 (1930); Oehler v. State, 202 Wis. 530, 232 N. W. 866 (1930); see Commonwealth v. Szachewicz, 303 Pa. 410, 416, 154 Atl. 483, 484 (1931); (1931) 22 J. CRIM. L. 437. 
It should be noted that the discussion .throughout this paper centers around 
legal tests for determining insanity at the time of the offense. However, an "in- 
sane" defendant cannot be tried or convicted, N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) ? 1120; N. Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. (1881) ? 481. The defendant is deemed capable of standing trial if he is able to comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him, and to 
aid counsel in the preparation of his defense. Cf. cases cited infra, note 80. 
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there is no guaranty that such tests are exclusively adhered to in prac- 
tice; so that, though the knowledge test alone may nominally exist in 
most jurisdictions, instances are not infrequent when other tests, 
officially taboo, are actually given the jury. . . . The habit of mixing 
numerous tests and scraps of tests in a judge's charge . . . is by no 
means uncommon."26 
Again, in regard to the "nature and quality" rule, there is a great 
deal of discussion as to whether "nature" and "quality" are synonomous, 
and, if not, what each means.27 Similarly a great deal has been written 
about the meaning of the term "know" in this connection, and, in some 
instances, judges have attempted to define the term to juries.28 It is 
difficult to imagine how this could do more than add to their con- 
fusion.29 
(2) Delusion rule. The delusion concept does not itself generally 
constitute a separate rule, but is used in connection with the "right and 
wrong" test and the irresistible impulse test. The law in regard 
to delusion is in just as muddled a state as any of the other rules 
on the subject.30 The light of modern knowledge has not diffused the 
almost mystical but yet convenient and homely notion of the depart- 
mental mind. 
(3) Irresistible impulse rule. No mention was made in M'Naghten's 
case of irresistible impulse. In some jurisdictions it has been held 
proper to instruct juries that the defendant should be acquitted if he 
committed the act in question because of an irresistible impulse.31 In 
some states, though it is not recognized as a defense, juries are in- 
structed that if the irresistible impulse is the result of mental disease 
sufficient to "obliterate the sense of right and wrong,'.' the defendant 
should be excused from responsibility.32 It seems doubtful if this test, 
followed literally, is any broader than the simple "right and wrong" 
8 S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 218. Compare, e.g., State v. Miller, 225 
S. W. 913 (Mo. 1920) with State v. Weagley, 228 S. W. 817 (Mo. 1921). 
Compare the discussion of OPPENHEIMER, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
LUNATICS (1909) 142, with that of S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 215, 219. 
281 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 125; Prince, The Criminal Responsibil- 
ity of Insane Persons (1907) 49 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1643. 
29It is of course clear that the criticisms already made of the rule in 
M'Naghten's Case apply equally to the various American versions of the tests there 
laid down. To be emphasized is the blanket criticism stressed by commentators- 
the tests are uncertain and impracticable. 
o0 S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 245 et seq. 
31 Smith v. United States, 36 F.(2d) 548 (App. D. C. 1929); State v. Green, 
6 P.(2d) 177 (Utah 1931); Miller v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky. 448, 33 S. W. (2d) 
590 (1930); see (1931) 70 A. L. R. 659; S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 267 
et seq. 32 See Sartin v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 571, 574, 103 S. W. 875, 877 (1907); State 
v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 753, 15 S. E. 982, 990 (1892). 
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test.33 It may also be noted that the seemingly hybrid quality of the 
test is not calculated to simplify the task of the jury. 
But acceptance of the general irresistible impulse test is significant; 
it indicates that a great gap between medical and legal opinion has been 
narrowed. Recognition that the volitional mode of activity should be 
considered just as important a causal factor in human conduct as the 
cognitive, tends to pave the way toward legal acceptance of the con- 
ception of a unified personality, and of the validity of scientific protest 
against the abstract compartmentalizing of the mind. All this is true. 
But our procedural and administrative devices are not calculated to 
make the results, when the test is applied, certain and consistent. It is 
to be doubted whether any remedy for the situation can be effected 
through changes in the substantive law, if the machinery remains un- 
changed.34 
(4) No rule. In New Hampshire the rules in M'Naghten's case 
and all other tests of irresponsibility have been entirely repudiated. 
The courts in that state have concluded that the tests so far devised 
are calculated only to confuse the jury.35 In their view the question 
of whether the defendant should be held irresponsible because of "in- 
sanity" is a pure question of fact to be left entirely in the hands of the 
jury. They are told that if they find that the act was the product of 
a mental disease, the defendant is to be excused on the ground of in- 
sanity. In other words, juries in New Hampshire are frankly told to 
decide both the questions of mental disease and criminal irresponsibility, 
and there is a consequent merger of these two issues, which are 
sedulously kept apart in classical theory. 
This view has been severely criticized on the ground that it is a 
complete surrender to the jury.36 That it is a surrender cannot be denied. 
But again the question must be asked whether any of the tests really help 
juries in arriving at their conclusions. The classical theory applicable to 
this problem splits the issue into two component parts. On the one hand 
there is the supposed medical question of fact to be decided by the 
jury on the evidence: whether or not the defendant was "insane." If 
the jury find that the defendant was insane, they are then to apply the 
33 What the jury are expressly told to consider is whether or not the sense of 
right and wrong was obliterated. Whether the mental disease caused an irresistible 
impulse seems quite unimportant, for even if it did not, the defendant would still 
theoretically be excused from responsibility if he could not distinguish between 
right and wrong. 34 For a collection of additional criticisms of the irresistible impulse test, see 
S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 233 et seq. 
35 Cf. State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (1870); State v. Jones, supra note 20. 
36 OPPENHEIMER, supra note 27, at 56; 1 WHARTON AND STILL], op. cit. supra 
note 6, at 95. S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 263. 
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legal tests of irresponsibility given to them by the court. The New 
Hampshire rule denies the utility of such a separation of issues. This 
view quite frankly faces the realities of the problem. Few juries make 
this fine distinction; the courts do not as a general rule make the dis- 
tinction clear. Medical experts are not only asked their opinion as to 
the mental condition of the defendant, but are also asked to state 
whether he was "responsible" or could "distinguish right from wrong,"37 
thus making it virtually impossible for juries to make the theoretical 
distinction between insanity and irresponsibility. While the New Hamp- 
shire rule is to be commended for its frankness, it still retains the 
outworn notion that "insanity" is a definite state of mental disorder. 
In addition, the caution sounded before as to the utility of any changes 
in substantive rules without radical changes along procedural and ad- 
ministrative lines, is repeated. 
MECHANICAL ASPECTS OF PROBLEM 
(1) Raising the question of irresponsibility. Under the common 
law practice, which is followed in the majority of states in this coun- 
try, the question of irresponsibility is put in issue by a general plea 
of not guilty; in a few jurisdictions it must be specially pleaded.38 
The details of the methods by which the issue is raised are not nearly 
as important as the underlying premise upon which the details are 
based. The raising of the issue is left entirely in the hands of lay- 
men. There lies beneath this procedure the assumption noted at the 
beginning of this paper, that "insanity" is a definite state of mental 
disorder, which is capable of discernment by laymen. But medical 
science has demonstrated that not all mental disorder is manifest and 
dramatic.39 Relegating to laymen the task of raising the issue of 
mental disturbance must go far toward causing the trial of many suffer- 
ing from what might be regarded by psychiatrists as acute and danger- 
ous mental disorder.40 
(2) Method of presenting medical testimony. (a) Qualification of 
experts. In presenting medical testimony to the jury, the same methods 
are employed as in presenting any other kind of expert testimony. 
Each side retains its experts. There are no specific qualifying tests. 
Determination of who is an expert is not made until trial. Questions 
37 See infra, p. 944 et seq. 
38Note (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 650; (1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 830. The minority 
view, although unnecessarily harsh, has been recommended by the MISSOURI CRIME 
SURVEY (1926) 399. 39 See Singer, Deranged or Defective Delinquent (1929) in ILLINOIS CRIME 
SURVEY 741. 
"4 See infra, p. 958 et seq., in connection with the Briggs Law. 
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are first asked the proposed witness for the purpose of qualifying him 
as an expert, and generally the court then allows the witness to testify. 
A recent study tends to indicate that the average caliber of testifying 
experts is not as high as might be hoped.41 It should be noticed that 
the problem of devising means for eliminating unqualified experts is 
of peculiar importance because of the lay belief that if one is a doctor 
he is necessarily acquainted with problems of mental disorder. 
(b) Opposing expert testimony. The fact that experts testify not 
impartially but on behalf of one side or the other injects into the pro- 
ceedings a spirit of seeming partisanship which psychiatrists are as 
anxious to avoid as anyone. The false light in which the competitive 
system of conducting a trial places them has been bitterly denounced.42 
No doubt some of the conflict of expert testimony is due to the fact 
that there are doctors who are willing to testify as asked but it is 
probably safe to say that a large part of the contumely heaped upon 
medical experts is caused not by corruption but by the appearance of 
partisanship which under the present system is unavoidable. It is un- 
necessary here to elaborate in any greater detail on the confusion that 
opposing expert testimony must cause, and the effect that it must have 
on the jury. 
(c) Questions put to experts. A psychiatrist is by training 
equipped to state more adequately than a layman whether the defendant 
is suffering from mental disease, and if so, to describe its nature,43 
specify its cause, and prescribe its treatment. In addition he is also 
peculiarly qualified to state what may be expected of the particular 
disordered defendant in the future under varying conditions such as 
imprisonment, complete release, commitment to specialized institutions, 
etc. But he speaks in a tongue not his own when he is forced to state 
whether the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong, 
or knew the nature and quality of his act.44 These are terms of law 
or ethics but they are not terms of modern medicine, and medical ex- 
4See Singer, supra note 39, at 754 et seq. The conclusions are not very 
significant because of the small number of cases examined. A list was compiled of 39 physicians who had testified as experts in Cook County. Six were from outside 
the state and were regarded as fully qualified. Of the 33 local physicians, 15 were 
members of the Chicago Neurological Society and had special experience in psy- 
chiatry. A group of 9 physicians, though not members of the Neurological So- 
ciety, were, or had been, members of the staff of state hospitals for mental diseases. 
A group of 9 had no special training or experience. 
42 WHITE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 7. 
" The tendency of psychiatrists to attach to mental disorders labels that are 
incapable of being understood by laymen has been severely criticized. See Adler, 
Organization of Psychopathic Work in the Criminal Courts (1917) 8 J. CRIM. L. 362. 
See Campbell, Crime and Punishment: From the Point of View of the 
Psychopathologist (1928) 19 J. CRIM. L. 244; WHITE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 102; S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 489. 
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perts should not be required to answer them. Yet they are typical of 
some of the questions asked expert witnesses. 
(d) The hypothetical question. Where the medical expert has not 
examined the defendant (and sometimes where he has !45) he is allowed 
to state his opinion only in answer to an hypothetical question. The 
question, framed by counsel for defense or prosecution, is supposed to 
include all the relevant circumstances which each claims have been 
proved, and to inquire what the expert's opinion would be on the 
basis of these facts. As White points out, the permission granted 
counsel to frame an hypothetical question on the basis of testimony 
which he regards as having been proved, may very well create an im- 
pression in the minds of the jury that the data contained in the question 
have in fact been proved.46 In addition, it is likely that after listening 
to a long hypothetical question the jury are in a position to judge less 
intelligently than they would be if the expert were allowed to give his 
opinion directly by specific reference to the defendant. And when 
counsel adopt the habit, as they frequently do, of adding to or subtract- 
ing from symptoms, the situation is aggravated. Lind brings this 
out clearly: 
"'Now, suppose we leave that out, would that affect your opinion?' The 
unwary witness may thus see 4 or 5 of his symptoms dropped and then be- 
come uneasy at their dwindling, say when it is suggested that the next symptom 
be elided, that he would then change his opinion. This gives the cross-ex- 
aminer his opportunity. He says, 'In other words, you wouldn't call him in- 
sane without this symptom . . .but you would with it?' This focuses an 
undue attention on this particular symptom and it is attacked intensively, with 
the result that if the witness is obliged to admit that it is not in itself in- 
dicative of insanity it seems to the jury as if he had abandoned the one thing he 
emphasized."47 
SOME SUGGESTED CHANGES 
The foregoing presents a brief picture of the operation of the 
present law. Suggested changes, some sweeping, others aimed at 
specific difficulties, will now be considered. 
A. Changes in the Tests 
A recent English case48 gave rise to public agitation similar to that 
which resulted from the acquittal of M'Naghten. After the decision, 
45 See, e.g., People v. Raizen, 211 App. Div. 446, 466, 208 N. Y. Supp. 185, 204 
(2d Dept. 1925); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) ? 675. 
4" WHITE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 84. On the subject of hypothetical questions 
generally see WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 45, ?? 672, 686. 47 See Lind, The Cross Examination of the Alienist (1922) 13 J. CRIM. L. 228, 
234. 
"Appeal of Ronald True, 16 Cr. App. R. 164 (1922), discussed in CARSWELL, 
TRIAL OF RONALD TRUE (1925); MEREDITH, op. cit. supra note 13, at 40 et seq. 
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the whole subject was referred to a special committee for study. The 
committee recommended that irresistible impulse be recognized as a 
defense in cases of mental disorder.49 The report has not yet been 
acted upon by Parliament50 but as previously indicated, the proposed 
change is but a toddling step in the right direction. The suggestion 
was made despite the recommendation of the Medico-Psychological 
Association of Great Britain and Ireland that the tests of M'Naghten's 
case be wholly abrogated and that the jury be asked three questions: 
"a. Did the prisoner commit the act alleged? 
b. If he did, was he at the time insane? 
c. If he was insane, has it nevertheless been proved to the satisfaction 
of the jury that his crime was unrelated to his mental disorder?"'5 
This, it will be noted, frankly leaves the question in the hands of the 
jury. For its frankness it is to be commended. But it touches only one 
phase of the problem and is therefore inadequate. 
In 1915, a committee appointed by the American Institute of 
Criminal Law and Criminology recommended that the substantive law be 
changed as follows: 
"No person shall hereafter be convicted of any criminal charge when at 
the time of the act or omission alleged against him he was suffering from 
mental disease and by reason of such mental disease he did not have the 
particular state of mind that must accompany such act or omission in order 
to constitute the crime charged."52 
Although approved by the Conference on Medical Legislation of 
the American Medical Association, this suggestion has since in effect 
been repudiated by the Institute,53 and has been the target of justifiable 
criticism by commentators. "Criminal intent is a technical doctrine in 
the criminal law difficult to apply. It is bad enough to ask a jury to 
pass on the question whether the defendant knew the difference be- 
49 See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER WHAT CHANGES, IF 
ANY, ARE DESIRABLE IN THE LAW IN WHICH THE PLEA OF INSANITY AS A DE- 
FENSE IS RAISED (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1923). 
50 In 1924 the committee's recommendation was referred to twelve High Court 
Judges for their opinion. Ten of the twelve judges advised against admitting the 
irresistible impulse defense. See MEREDITH, op. cit. supra note 13, at 70. 
51The Report is reprinted in CARSWELL, op. cit. supra note 48, at 276 et seq. 52 See Report of Committee "B" of the Institute, Insanity and Criminal Re- 
sponsibility (1911) 9 J. CRIM. L. 521, 533 for a preliminary discussion, and Keedy, 
Insanity and Criminal Responsibility (1917) 30 HARV. L. REV. 535, 536, 724 for a 
discussion of the draft quoted. It will be noted that this test is substantially that 
suggested by Coke. See note 9, supra. 
53Report of Committee "A" of the Institute, Insanity and Criminal Respon- 
sibility (1919) 10 J. CRIM. L. 184, 186, where the suggestion discussed infra, note 
62, is set out. 
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tween right and wrong in relation to the act he committed. It is much 
worse to have to ask whether he knew the difference between right and 
wrong in relation to the particular intent which the particular crime 
requires."54 
A more elaborate proposal has been advanced by Sheldon Glueck. 
He states that, regardless of the procedure adopted to weed out the 
mentally unsound prior to trial, there will still be left cases in which the 
issue must be decided at trial. He then suggests a program for im- 
proving the law in this particular.55 In this program, these fundamentals 
of medical science would be judicially noticed by the courts: The unity 
of mental process and the consequent presumption that disorder in one 
phase of behavior is indicative of a. disorder of the mind as a unity; 
the "tripartite, although only abstractly separable, nature of mental ac- 
tivity, i.e., the cognitive, conative, affective modes of mental life"; certain 
fundamentals of psychopathology: the concept of disintegration or lack 
of synthesis of the personality, and the fact that hallucinations, delu- 
sions, obsessions, etc., are evidences of a generally diseased mind, and do 
not themselves constitute the disease. 
He then suggests a model charge to the jury which because of its 
length will not be set out here in its entirety. The first part, however, is 
of such importance that it will be quoted: 
"Every illegal act in order to make its perpetrator criminally responsible 
for it, required that it shall have been committed with a 'guilty' (or 'criminal') 
intent. For a mind to be able in contemplation of the law, to have this neces- 
sary 'guilty intent,' it must be sound, in the sense that the minds of most men 
are sound. The mental soundness of most men presupposes a normally healthy 
functioning of the mind's activities of knowing and reasoning, and willing and 
restraining one's impulses to act, and feeling. But you are instructed that, 
because of the recognized interdependence of mental processes, a serious dis- 
order of any of these principal mental activities, raises a strong presumption 
that the mind as a whole is disordered." 
The jury are then told that all the evidence they have heard should 
be regarded as throwing light on the question of mental soundness. 
Three steps are then to be taken by the jury: 
1. They must first inquire whether the prosecution has proved be- 
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did the act charged. If 
this has not been proved, a verdict of "non-offender" should be re- 
turned. 
4 See Kidd and Ball, Law and Mental Diseases (1920) 9 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4. 
See also Ballantine, Criminal Responsibility of the Insane aid Feeble Minded 
(1919) 9 J. CRIM. L. 485; Note (1916) 30 HARV. I. REV. 179. 
55 S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 476 et seq. 
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2. If this burden has been sustained by the prosecution, the jury 
must then determine whether "the defendant has established his in- 
sanity (as to knowing and reasoning, or willing and controlling his im- 
pulses to act, or feeling), by 'a fair preponderance of the evidence.'" 
(Italics Glueck's.) 
3. (a) If the defendant has not established his insanity, the jury 
must further inquire whether the defendant's mental condition "though 
not proved to be unsound in the sense above described" was such that 
he did not have the special mental condition (mentioning the condition) 
necessary for the particular grade of the offense. If defendant is found 
not to have the requisite mental condition, the verdict should be "sane 
offender, but guilty of murder in the second degree (or insert appro- 
priate grade or degree and type of offense)." Otherwise the verdict 
should be "sane offender." (b) If insanity has been established by a 
fair preponderance of the evidence, the next step is to determine 
whether the defendant is irresponsible. For the determination of that 
question these tests are to be used: (1) "Did this insane defendant, 
when he committed the act, know the physical nature of the act?" 
(Italics Glueck's.) (2) Did he know it was wrong in the sense that it 
was condemned by morals, religion "and laws of modern civilized so- 
ciety"? (3) If he knew both of the above, was he nevertheless unable, 
by reason of mental disorder, to control his impulses "with respect to 
the act"? (Italics Glueck's.) 
If the answer to any or all of these questions is "yes," the verdict 
should be "partially insane and semi-responsible offender." 
The charge then reminds the jury that before applying these tests, 
they must have found the defendant insane "as evidenced by typical 
symptoms of the disorder of the knowing and reasoning, feeling (or 
emotional), or willing and inhibiting functions of the mind; and that 
evidence of disorder in one type of mental operation strongly implies 
disorder of the others." 
The jury is then told what the consequences of the different ver- 
dicts will be. A "sane offender" suffers the penalty provided by law, 
depending on the degree of the offense found. If a person is found to 
be an "insane and irresponsible offender," he will be confined, for the 
safety of society and himself, in an asylum, to remain there until an 
officer of the asylum notifies the court that he has recovered his mental 
health and may safely be released, "or until he is otherwise lawfully 
discharged." If a defendant is found to be a "partially insane and semi- 
responsible offender" he will (if charged with murder in the first de- 
gree) be incarcerated in a hospital or prison for life, depending on the 
severity of the mental disorder. On a finding by the state department 
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of mental diseases that he may safely be returned to society, he may be 
pardoned by the governor. In other words, in the case of the "partially 
insane andc semi-responsible" offender, discharge is a matter of grace. 
This proposal is open to the following criticism: 
(1) In the first paragraph quoted above, the term "mental sound- 
ness" is used. No definition is attempted except that this "presupposes 
a normally healthy functioning of the mind's activities of knowing and 
reasoning, willing and restraining one's impulses to act, and feeling." 
Later the word "insanity" is used, and the only intimation of a defini- 
tion is found in the statement that the jury is to find "whether or not 
the defendant has established his insanity (as to knowing and reasoning, 
or willing and controlling his impulses to act, or feeling)." If a dis- 
tinction is sought to be made between "mental soundness" and sanity, 
it is difficult to see what it is, or why a distinction is necessary. If no 
distinction was intended to be made, the unnecessary use of different 
terms is confusing. 
(2) The jury are reminded that there are two separate questions 
for them to determine, insanity and irresponsibility, and that the latter 
is not to be considered until they have first decided that the defendant 
is insane. It would seem that the jury are left practically unguided in 
their determination of whether the defendant is sane. No definition is 
expressly given and the terms used can hardly be said to have objective 
descriptive properties. It is extremely questionable whether the medi- 
cally disowned concept "insanity" can ever be defined in such a way as 
to prevent the jury from attaching to it whatever meaning they please. 
(3) The tests for determining irresponsibility are practically the 
same as those for determining insanity. For practical purposes, it may 
be said that the latter tests include merely the additional concept of 
"feeling." What that means is not explained. In view then of this 
practical identity of the two tests, and the repeated reminder that 
"insanity" and "irresponsibility" are two separate questions, it may 
reasonably be expected that confusion will result. If there is any dis- 
tinction, it is so fine as to be practically worthless for purposes of use 
by the jury. 
(4) The provision of the charge allowing a verdict of guilty of 
a lesser offense if the defendant's condition at the time of the commis- 
sion of the act, "though not proved to be unsound in the sense above 
described, was yet such that he could not, in all reasonable probability, 
have had the capacity for the deliberation, premeditation or malice (in- 
serting special type of mental condition necessary to reduce the grade 
of the offense)," is so vague and indefinite, that in practice it would be 
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tantamount to granting the jury permission to do just as they pleased, 
so far as reducing the grade of the offense is concerned. It requires an 
extremely deft hand to balance "mental condition" against such highly 
variable concepts as premeditation, deliberation, etc. 
(5) In the tests for determining "irresponsibility," the phrase 
"wrong in the sense that it was condemned by the morals, religion and 
laws of modern civilized society" cannot be said to be much of an im- 
provement over the simple "wrong" used in M'Naghten's case. 
(6) The tests for determining "responsibility" encounter the criti- 
cisms previously expressed in this paper. 
(7) The concept "partially insane and semi-responsible" is very 
likely to confuse the ordinary jury and its usefulness is therefore highly 
questionable. But whether or not this is true, the concept "partially 
insane" seems to fly in the face of what is continually pointed out as a 
fundamental of psychology-the unity of the mind. It seems rather 
strange to ask in one breath that the courts take judicial notice of "the 
unity of the mental process" and in the next to ask them to instruct 
in terms of "partial insanity." In another part of his book, Glueck says: 
"Intention, motive, volition we said are separable only for the purpose 
of analysis, since actual mental experience at any time can not be broken 
up, as the law assumes, into its cognitive, conative, and affective constit- 
uents; mental experience can be so analyzed only by a process of arti- 
ficial abstraction. The criminal intention includes the conative-affective, 
as well as the cognitive, capacity."56 (Italics Glueck's.) 
The creation of the category "partial insanity" was probably in- 
duced by the desire to afford juries, in cases of mental disorder which 
they would not regard as constituting "insanity," some alternative other 
than guilty or innocent. One wonders, however, whether today juries 
are not, at least in homicide cases, creating for themselves this middle 
zone, and whether the possible gain to be derived from the perpetuation 
of this frequently disowned category is worth the sacrifice of an em- 
phasized fundamental of psychology. 
(8) No mention is made of the methods of treatment or release of 
those found guilty of lesser offenses because of a mental condition 
which, "in all reasonable probability, deprived them of the capacity to 
have the specific" type of mental condition required for the higher de- 
gree, other than that they "will suffer the penalty provided by the law." 
A defendant is charged with robbery in the first degree. The medical 
testimony is to the effect that he is a psychopathic personality with a 
low intelligence. The jury are given the charge outlined above, which 
" Id., at 427. 
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contains the permission to find the defendant guilty of a lesser degree 
of robbery if they conclude that, though not mentally unsound, his 
mental faculties were impaired to such a degree as to render him in- 
capable of having the particular state of mind necessary for robbery in 
the first degree.57 If the charge had been murder in the first degree, a 
verdict of guilty of a lesser degree of homicide would mean imprison- 
ment for life. But the program contains no indication of what the re- 
sult should be in cases other than homicide. If the language of the 
charge is followed literally such a person would receive "the penalty 
provided by the law," which in the case of the example given here, 
might be a short prison sentence, resulting in the release of a person 
described as a psychopathic personality. Such a result does not appear 
to be calculated to protect society. 
(9) In the example given, the jury may find that the defendant, 
though insane, knew the physical nature of the act, or knew that it was 
wrong, or could have controlled his impulses. The verdict in such a 
case would be "partially insane and semi-responsible." The line between 
a finding of "insanity" (which we are told is merely a convenient ab- 
straction) and a finding of mental condition such as to render one in- 
capable of possessing the particular state of mind required (another ab- 
straction) is at best extremely faint. 
(10) No indication is given as to the period and place of detention 
of those found "partially insane and semi-responsible," but not charged 
with murder in the first degree. The criticism set forth in (8) applies 
here with equal force. 
(11) The last and most comprehensive criticism is one antici- 
pated by Glueck himself. The charge is long and confusing, and whether 
the jury will do what it ought to do remains, just as now, largely a mat- 
ter of chance. Glueck answers the criticism by saying that in compari- 
son with the charges now being given, it is the "very soul of wit."58 
That is true. But it has been shown above that the charge demands en- 
largement in some of its particulars. Besides, one doubts that it will 
continue to be brief when put to practical use by the ordinary run of 
trial court judges. Glueck states further that the danger of confusion 
will be minimized if copies of the charge are given to the jurymen. He 
also says, "Though intricate, its fundamental principles of law and psy- 
7 Whether the defendant's mental condition was such as to render him in- 
capable of having the particular state of mind required, seems essentially a meta- 
physical question. This is tantamount to giving the jury a carte blanche to do as it 
likes. Juries today are in the same position, except that they have three possible 
choices-guilty, innocent, and guilty of a lesser offense. The procedure suggested 
affords the additional choice of "partially insane and semi-responsible." That would 
seem, however, to be the only difference. 8 S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 481. 
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chology are, we believe, at least consistent."59 But as stated before, it 
is quite probable that courts will have a difficult time reconciling the 
request that they judicially notice the psychological concept of unity of 
the mind, with a charge containing the phrase "partial insanity." And 
even if conceptual reconciliation is possible, the criticism of intricacy is 
not met. 
B. Elimination of the Jury 
Various remedies, sometimes taking the form of statutory enact- 
ment, have been advanced for the obvious inadequacies of the jury sys- 
tem. Thus it has been suggested that the testimony of impartial experts 
appointed by the court be conclusive on the issue of insanity,60 or that 
the jury be composed solely of medical experts.61 More common has 
been the proposal that the jury be called upon to determine only whether 
the offense has been committed by the defendant. The determination 
of irresponsibility, due to "insanity" at the time of the offense or at the 
trial, is left entirely in the hands of the trial judge, who, it is contem- 
plated, will seek impartial medical advice.62 
Wherever enacted into law such proposals have been uniformly 
held unconstitutional as violative of the guaranty of jury trial.63 The 
theory is that extirpation of the insanity defense deprives the jury of an 
inalienable function, the ascertainment of the criminal intent necessary 
to convict. The argument that the legislature may change the elements 
of old crimes or create new ones, in which case the defendant gets a jury 
trial of all the elements in the statutory definition64 is met by vague ob- 
jections, such as "cruel and unusual punishment,"65 "due process"66 
and "the law of nature."67 
69 Id. 
6 NEW YORK CRIME COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT OF PSYCHIATRIC AND EX- 
PERT TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL CASES, (1928) (conclusive only if unanimous); 
La. Laws Extra Session 1928, No. 17 (conclusive if majority). 61 Eugene Smith, Criminal Law in the United States, in CORRECTION AND PRE- 
VENTION (Russell Sage Foundation, 1910) 112. 
6233 REP. N. Y. BAR ASS'N 391, 401; Report of Committee "A" of the 
Institute, supra note 53; ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY (1929) 809; see White, Com- 
petency of Jurors to Pass on Insanity Question (1913) 4 J. CRIM. L. 106; 
Miss. Code Ann. (1930) ??1327, 1328 (insanity no defense in homicide-to go 
in mitigation only); Wash. Laws 1909, c. 249, ? 7 (insanity no defense to crime). 3 State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020 (1910); State v. Lange, 
168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929); Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581 (Miss. 1931), dis- 
cussed in (1932) 22 J. CRIM. L. 899. 4 See Smith, C.J., dissenting, in Sinclair v. State, supra note 63, at 591. 
eSee Sinclair v. State, supra note 63, at 585. It should be noted that this 
problem is really not involved at all. The statutes merely work a change in the 
method of trial of the issue of insanity. In either case, the defendant, if found 
insane, goes to an asylum. See Rudkin, C.J., concurring in State v. Strasburg, 
supra note 63, at 126, 110 Pac. at 1026. In addition, it is difficult to reconcile this 
view with the rejection by these states of irresistible impulse as a defense. See 
Smith, C.J., dissenting, in Sinclair v. State, supra note 63, 132 So. at 591. 
66 See State v. Strasburg, supra note 63, at 116, 126, 110 Pac. at 1023, 1026. 
67 See Sinclair v. State, supra note 63, at 589. 
952 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 16:45:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PROBLEM OF MENTAL DISORDER IN CRIME 
Some arguments against the elimination of the jury have proceeded 
on other than constitutional grounds. Sheldon Glueck believes that the 
jury represent the "group mind"; the purpose of the jury system is to 
"furnish an approximate safeguard of personal freedom and reputa- 
tion." Therefore, while every effort should be made to raise the caliber 
of jurors, and while the jury "should be given every opportunity to un- 
derstand the fundamentals of psychology and psychopathology involved 
in insanity cases, and to hear the well founded reports of unbiased ex- 
perts, the jury, as a responsibility determining device, should not be 
eliminated."68 Glueck's argument for retaining the jury can hardly be 
said to be conclusive. It is based on assumptions not empirically proved. 
But the matter can only be settled by experimentation, and this will 
probably involve, constitutional amendment. Until experimentation has 
yielded its answer the question must be regarded as open. 
C. Separate Trial of the Issue of Insanity 
Some states have sought to improve the situation by requiring a 
separate trial of the issue of insanity. Generally these states require 
that the issue of insanity be tried first, although a recent California stat- 
ute provides for a prior trial on the merits.69 Such changes are quite 
superficial. The old tests are used in the old way.70 Whether greater 
8 S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 465. In this connection it is interesting 
to compare the point of view taken by Glueck in respect to the jury in other parts 
of his book. Thus he says: "The author has sometimes wondered at the naivete 
of some writers on the criminal law, who seem to assume that in the vast majority 
of cases, after listening for days to a mass of conflicting, intricate and confusing 
testimony, to a series of hypothetical questions, and a long, frequently confusing, 
if not contradictory, trial-judge's charge, a jury of untrained laymen can retire to 
the cloistral calm of a stuffy jury room and contemplate on the judge's words of 
legal wisdom, deciding the case in strict accordance with the formal tests of crim- 
inal irresponsibility applicable to insanity cases !" Op. cit. at 108, n. 1. 
"In the realm of the borderline cases of mental unsoundness, then, it is espe- 
cially true that the jury represents prevailing public opinion and sentiment,-a sort 
of miniature group mind, disposing of cases not so much on the basis of the charges 
of trial judges as to the law of the tests of irresponsibility, as upon its own con- 
ception of rough-and-ready justice. Especially true is this in those jurisdictions 
where, as in Illinois, the jury judges the law as well as the facts, and where, as in 
California and a few other states, the jury has the power of fixing the penalty." 
Op. cit. at 207. 9 Shepherd, Plea of Insanity under the 1927 Amendment to the California 
Code (1929) 3 So. CALIF. L. REV. 1; Note (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 650; Note (1931) 
19 CALIF. L. REV. 174. REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA CRIME COMMISSION (1931) 
32 et seq. Such statutes are constitutional. They do not put defendant twice in 
jeopardy for the same offense, People v. Leong Fook, 206 Cal. 64, 273 Pac. 
779 (1928); nor do they deprive him of life or liberty without a jury trial, or 
due process of law. State v. Toon, 172 La. 631, 135 So. 7 (1931) ; People v. 
Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 273 Pac. 767 (1929), cert. den., 280 U. S 524, 50 Sup. Ct. 87 
(1929); Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 14 N. W. 912 (1883); (1929) 77 U. oF PA. 
L. REV. 923. 
70 Cf., e.g., People v. Lizarraga, supra note 25. 
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clarity is secured by separating the issues is questionable. It is probable 
that this type of legislation is enacted in the hope that the facts of the 
particular case will not prejudice the jury in their deliberations on the 
issue of insanity. But the question of insanity cannot be considered 
in vacuo; the facts of the particular case are necessarily involved in de- 
termining that issue. Further, the California statute permits the court, 
in its discretion, to retain the same jury for the "prompt trial of the is- 
sue of insanity," a procedure which has been uniformly followed by the 
courts of that state.71 This amounts to no change at all. Finally, the 
inhumanity of subjecting possibly seriously disordered defendants to 
the strain of a trial is apparent.72 
D. Improvement in the Character of Expert Testimony 
In view of the constitutional infirmities to which the more radical 
of the preceding proposals are subject, it seems necessary, for the pres- 
ent at least, to concentrate on the improvement of existing devices, es- 
pecially that of expert testimony. In 1915, a committee of the Institute 
of Criminal Law and Criminology composed of lawyers and psychia- 
trists recommended a bill which has been the basis of much of the sub- 
sequent thinking and legislation on the subject. It provides as follows: 
"Sec. 1. Summoning of Witnesses by Court. Whenever in the trial of a 
criminal case the issue of insanity on the part of the defendant is raised, the 
judge of the trial court may call one or more disinterested qualified experts, 
not exceeding three, to testify at the trial, and if the judge does so, he shall 
notify counsel of the witnesses so called, giving their names and addresses. 
Upon the trial of the case, the witnesses called by the court may be examined 
regarding their qualifications and their testimony by counsel for the prosecu- 
tion and defense. Such calling of witnesses by the court shall not preclude the 
prosecution or defense from calling other expert witnesses at the trial. The 
witnesses called by the judge shall be allowed such fees as in the discretion 
of the judge seem just and reasonable, having regard to the services performed 
by the witnesses. The fees so allowed shall be paid by the county where the 
indictment was found. 
"Sec. 2. Written Report by Witnesses. When the issue of insanity has 
been raised in a criminal case, each expert witness, who has examined or ob- 
served the defendant, may prepare a written report regarding the mental condi- 
tion of the defendant based upon such examination or observation, and such re- 
port may be read by the witness at the trial after being duly sworn. The 
written report prepared by the witness shall be submitted by him to counsel 
for either party before being read to the jury, if request for this is made to the 
71 Cf. People v. Troche, supra note 70; People v. Strong, 114 Cal. App. 522, 
300 Pac. 84 (1931); see Preston, J., dissenting in People v. Troche, supra note 69, 
at 51, 273 Pac. at 775. 
72 See Overholser, Psychiatry and the Courts of Massachusetts (1928) 19 J. 
CRIM. L. 75. 
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court by counsel. If the witness presenting the report was called by the prose- 
cution or defense, he may be cross-examined regarding his report by counsel 
for the other party. If the witness was called by the court, he may be examined 
regarding his report by counsel for the prosecution and defense. 
"Sec. 3. Commitment to Hospital for Observation. Whenever in the trial 
of a criminal case the existence of mental disease on the part of the accused, 
either at the time of the trial or at the time of the commission of the alleged 
wrongful act, becomes an issue in the case, the judge of the court before 
whom the accused is to be tried or is being tried shall commit the accused to 
the-State Hospital for the Insane, to be detained there for purposes of observa- 
tion until further order of court. The court shall direct the superintendent of 
the hospital to permit all the expert witnesses summoned in the case to have 
free access to the accused for purposes of observation. The court may also di- 
rect the chief physician of the hospital to prepare a report regarding the mental 
condition of the accused. This report may be introduced in evidence at the 
trial under the oath of said chief physician, who may be cross-examined re- 
garding the report by counsel for both sides."73 
It will be noted that the chief purpose of the proposed law was to 
provide for the selection of impartial experts whose testimony would 
probably be given great weight by the jury. Similar legislation has been 
enacted in several states,74 and recent cases have held it constitutional.75 
Unquestionably the proposal represents a great improvement. Certain 
defects are however manifest. 
73 The bill is quoted and discussed in Keedy, supra note 52; WHITE, op. cit. 
supra note 3, at 143 et seq. See also, Report of American Psychiatric Association, 
(1928) 19 J. CRIM. L. 373; MINUTES OF SECOND JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF PENN- 
SYLVANIA (1929); Brand, The Insanity Defense (1930) 9 ORE. L. REV. 309. The 
provisions in ? 1 as to reasonable fees were inserted at the recommendation of the 
National Crime Commission, which adopted the legislation in its amended form. 
The bill is incorporated in the model code of Criminal Procedure of the American 
Law Institute. See OFFICIAL DRAFT (1930) ? 308, and COMMENTARY at 921. 
A somewhat similar suggestion was made in 1924 by the Medico-Psychological 
Association of Great Britain and Ireland, and the British Medical Society. No state- 
ment was made as to the method of selecting the experts. The recommendations 
were rejected by the Committee on Insanity and Crime on the ground that the panel 
would have to range over the entire country and that in some parts of the country 
there would be difficulty in finding suitable members. To insure that persons with- 
out means would have suitable medical testimony, the Committee recommended that 
the accused or his lawyer or the prosecution or the committing magistrate should be 
free to apply to the Home Office for a mental examination, the government to 
bear the expense unless the accused could reasonably bear it. See REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 49. 
"4 Mich. Laws 1905, no. 175, ? 3; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, Supp. 1929) ? 2291; 
OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1931) ?? 13441-4; WIS. STAT. (1929) ? 357.12; Colo. Laws 
1927, c. 90, ?2; CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1923) ? 1871; CAL. PEN. CODE (Deer- 
ing, 1923) ? 1027. 75 People v. Strong, supra note 72; Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N. W. 
634 (1930); 1 WIGMORE, VIDENCE (1923) ? 563; Taft, Opinion Evidence of Ex- 
pert Witnesses (1927) 14 VA. L. REV. 81, 88. Contra: People v. Dickerson, 164 
Mich. 148, 129 N. W. 199 (1910). Professor Wigmore argues (? 2484) that even 
in the absence of statute, the trial court has inherent power to summon witnesses. 
See State v. Home, 171 N. C. 787, 788, 88 S. E. 433, 433 (1916); Tugman v. 
Riverside Cotton Mills, 144 Va. 473, 495, 132 S. E. 179, 185 (1926). But see 
People v. Scott, 326 I11. 327, 345, 157 N. E. 247, 256 (1927). 
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(1) It is couched in discretionary and not mandatory terms. Over- 
holser shows that many trial courts are not prone to avail themselves of 
psychiatric advice.76 Probably the constitutional issue would remain 
unaltered if the statute were couched in mandatory terms.77 
(2) Determination of when an inquiry into the mental state of the 
defendant should be made is still left to laymen. Further, it is doubt- 
ful whether the machinery can be set in motion unless the defendant 
himself raises the question. 
(3) The proposed bill says merely that the court may call upon 
"disinterested qualified experts." No attempt is made to state who 
shall be regarded as a qualified expert. This is peculiarly a job for the 
medical profession. The bill should contain a section describing the 
qualifications necessary, or providing that standards be set up by a neu- 
ro-psychiatric society, or state department of mental diseases, or some 
similar agency.78 
The New York Crime Commission has had legislation in respect 
of expert testimony under consideration for some time. In its latest 
report it recommends two bills.79 These provide for a board of psy- 
chiatric examiners composed of the state commissioners of mental hy- 
giene, education, and health. Only psychiatrists certified by this board 
may testify as experts in a criminal action. The minimum prerequisites 
to certification are as follows:, 
76Oberholser, Psychiatric Service in Criminal Courts (1928) 12 MEN- 
TAL *HYGIENE 818, 833. A supplemental study will be found in Psychiatric Facil- ities in Criminal Courts in United States: A Supplementary Note (1929) 13 MEN- 
TAL HYGIENE 800. 
7 People v. Dickerson, supra note 75 goes off not on the presence or absence 
of a mandatory provision but on the theory that there is a delegation of non-judi- 
cial power to the courts. Id., at 153, 129 N. W. at 201. The additional argu- 
ment is made in this case that the procedure violates due process in that the court 
gives implied certification of character and fitness to its own experts. "To give to 
the testimony of a witness or witnesses this extraordinary certificate of candor, 
ability, and truthfulness ... is to subvert the very foundations of justice." 
Id., at 155, 129 N. W. at 201. The usual legal attitude toward the insanity ques- 
tion is nowhere more clearly illustrated. See also CANTOR, CRIME, CRIMINALS AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932) 209. 78 Such a recommendation was made in the ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY (1929) 765 
Sheldon Glueck approves of the proposed bill of the Institute, but suggests an 
amendment to insure that only properly qualified experts will testify. This defines 
a qualified expert as "a physician who has been resident in the State for at least 
two years, who has been lawfully licensed to practice medicine in this state, and 
who has been in the actual practice of medicine for at least three years, at least 
two of which must have been spent in the diagnosis and treatment of mental and 
nervous diseases, either in legitimate private practice or in a hospital for mental 
patients, or both." See S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 489. 
For a discussion of the institution of and the need for permanent psychiatric 
clinics, see REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF OHIO (1931) 27 et seq. 
79 See NEW YORK COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT ON PSYCHIATRIC AND EXPERT 
TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL CASES (1930) 155 et seq. 
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"That he is a physician duly licensed to practice in the State of New York 
and has had at least five years experience in actual practice; and that either 
(a) he has had at least three years' experience since January first, 1915, in the 
care and treatment of persons suffering from mental diseases, in an institu- 
tion providing for the care of such persons . .. ; or (b) that he has devoted 
the five years immediately prior to filing his application for certification to a 
private practice confined wholly or substantially to the care and treatment of 
persons suffering from nervous and mental diseases." 
The second bill is in the form of an amendment to section 658 
of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure. The proposed ma- 
chinery is set in operation "in all cases where any person in confinement 
under indictment shall appear insane; or whenever a question arises in 
the mind of the court, the prosecuting attorney, or the attorney for the 
defendant, . . . or whenever the defendant pleads insanity. .. ." The 
defendant chooses one or two qualified experts, the prosecutor an equal 
number, and the court one. Each psychiatrist chosen examines the de- 
fendant in the presence of the others, and the group file a written re- 
port, dissenting opinions, if any, being also filed. Either side then has 
an opportunity to examine the psychiatrists before the court. If neither 
party objects to the report, and both agree that it be presented as the 
only evidence of the defendant's mental condition, the court shall so 
order, in which case no other expert testimony is admissible. If counsel 
fail to agree, the examining psychiatrists may be called as witnesses by 
either side or by the court. No other experts are then to be called ex- 
cept that the defendant may have two additional certified psychiatrists 
as witnesses. The latter are paid by the defendant, but at the fixed rate 
which the county pays the other experts.80 
80 The Report also contains a provision for the compensation of experts at a 
uniform rate, amending the present ? 662a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
The other relevant sections of the Code, ?? 659, 836, are reworded and made con- 
sistent with the radical revision of ? 658 set out in the text. 
These provisions present a great improvement over the present law: 
(1) Expert testimony. Under the present ? 658, when a defendant pleads in- 
sanity, "the court may appoint a commission of not more than three disinterested 
persons, to . . report as to his sanity at the time of the commission of the 
crime." It will be noted that: (a) commissioners need not be specially qualified. 
It has apparently been the practice for such commissions to call medical experts as 
witnesses, the fees being fixed by the court. See McGuire v. Prendergast, 159 
N. Y. Supp. 658, 664 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. 1915). Since under ?662a the commis- 
sioners are themselves reimbursed by the county, this procedure results in unneces- 
sary duplication of expense. (b) The appointment of a commission is discretion- 
ary. People v. McElvaine, 125 N. Y. 596, 26 N. E. 929 (1891); People v. Tobin, 
176 N. Y. 278, 68 N. E. 359 (1903); cf. People v. Rhinelander, 2 N. Y. Cr. R. 
335 (1884). The suggested provision is in terms mandatory. However, the result 
in the above cases was reached by liberally construing the provision "whenever it 
shall appear," etc., in an older version of ? 658 (discussed below). Since the same 
phrase persists in the proposed section, it is at least doubtful whether the mere 
change from may to shall will be efficacious. 
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It will be noted that with the single exception that inquiry into 
the defendant's mental state is still initiated by laymen, this legislative 
program meets all the objections levelled at the proposal of the Institute. 
A MORE RADICAL SUGGESTION 
The programs for improvement discussed above all retain the shell 
of the present system with its inherent weaknesses. If the problem of 
mental disorder and crime is essentially one of treatment, laymen are 
not equipped to handle it; their efforts seem today puny and anachro- 
nistic. The tendency of the times is directed towards divesting laymen of 
their control. The great problems are: What means can be devised to 
vest in the hands of the psychiatrists the task of ascertaining which of- 
fenders are mentally disordered? What means can be devised to give 
psychiatrists the power of determining what should be done with of- 
fenders, on the basis of a scientific ascertainment of the behavior that 
may be expected of offenders in the future? What institutional and 
non-institutional devices and structures are necessary to take care of 
the mentally disordered? The suggested and attempted remedies dis- 
(2) Procedure. The present ?659 provides that "if the commission find the 
defendant insane the trial or judgment must be suspended until he becomes sane. 
. ." Section 836, in another part of the Code, provides inter alia that if a person, 
"in confinement under indictment or under a criminal charge . . . shall appear to 
be insane," the judge shall commit him. . . until the question of his sanity is 
determined. 
Section 658 in terms applies to insanity at the time of the offense, but ? 659 and 
? 661 (dealing with the proceedings when defendant becomes sane) apparently apply 
only to insanity at the time of the trial, and their reference back to the commission 
appointed under ? 658 casts doubt on the interpretation of that section. S. Glueck 
believes that ? 658 also covers insanity at the time of the investigation. Op. cit. 
supra note 4, at 588, n.l. This interpretation seems unsound for two reasons: 
(a) Section 658 applies in terms only where defendant pleads insanity. Insanity 
at the time of trial may be raised without special plea, People v. Joyce, 233 N. Y. 
61, 134 N. E. 836 (1922), and apparently at any time in the proceeding. Cf. People 
v. White, 140 Misc. 701, 251 N. Y. Supp. 396 (Gen. Sess. 1931); People v. Mc- 
Elvaine, supra. (b) It completely disregards ? 836. In People v. White, supra, 
defendant claimed insanity at time of trial and raised the question before sentence. 
The court, making no mention of ? 836, ordered the appointment of a commission 
on the basis of ? 481, discussed supra note 25. But cf. People ex rel. Beldstein v. 
Thayer, 121 Misc. 745, 202 N. Y. Supp. 633 (County Ct. 1923) (defendant under 
indictment sent to an asylum by an order under ? 836). 
An examination of the statutory history of these provisions reveals the gen- 
esis of the contradiction in ?? 658, 659, 661. Section 658 of the Code formerly con- 
tained an additional provision to the effect that, "if a defendant in confinement, un- 
der indictment, appears to be insane at any time before or after conviction, the 
court may appoint a like commission to examine the defendant as to his sanity at 
the time of the examination." The earlier counterpart of ? 836-Laws 1874, c. 446, 
art. 2, ? 26, as finally amended by Laws 1898, c. 417, ? 1-was incorporated bodily 
into the Code by Laws 1909, c. 66. The duplication was immediately noted, and the 
very next year, when ? 836 was amended in certain particulars by Laws 1910, c. 557, 
the second part of ? 658 was deleted by ? 2 of the same chapter. However, ?? 659, 
661 were left untouched. Under the new provisions this confusion is avoided by 
appropriate amendments of all these sections. 
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cussed above are not aimed at the solution of these problems in their 
entirety. Their philosophy is Fabian. The suggestion to be treated 
now is a frontal attack. 
In 1921 the now famous Briggs Law was passed in Massachusetts. 
It provided as follows :81 
"Whenever a person is indicted by a grand jury for a capital offense or 
whenever a person, who is known to have been indicted for any other offense 
more than once or to have been previously convicted of a felony, is indicted 
by a grand jury or bound over for trial in the superior court, the clerk of the 
court in which the indictment is returned or the clerk of the district court or 
the trial justice, as the case may be, shall give notice to the department of 
mental diseases, and the department shall cause such person to be examined 
with a view to determine his mental condition and the existence of any mental 
disease or defect which would affect his criminal responsibility. The depart- 
ment shall file a report of its investigation with the clerk of the court in 
which the trial is to be held, and the report shall be accessible to the court, 
the district attorney and to the attorney for the accused, and shall be admis- 
sible as evidence of the mental condition of the accused." 
In 1925 the act was amended by striking out the clause providing for 
the admissibility of the report. This step was taken on the advice that 
otherwise the whole statute might be held unconstitutional.82 
From the passage of the act in 1921 to October, 1928, of 561 ex- 
amined, 231 were indicted for first degree murder, 6 for second degree 
murder, and 324 for various other offenses. Thirty-seven defendants 
were reported as suffering from definite psychoses. In the case of 14 
others, a period of observation was recommended. Fifty-five were re- 
ported as mentally defective or as defective delinquents and 15 as psy- 
chopathic personalities. Of the total number examined, 21.5% were 
found to be "suggestively or clearly abnormal mentally."83 
Of the 37 defendants reported to have "definite psychoses" in only 
three cases was the report of the psychiatrists disregarded. In one 
case sentence was imposed and the defendant imprisoned. He very 
shortly had to be committed to an insane asylum. In most of the other 
cases falling in the same group, the defendants were committed without 
the formality of trial. In a few cases, after a brief formal proceeding 
the defendant was held "not guilty by reason of insanity." This indi- 
cates a very high degree of cooperation between medical experts, counsel 
81 Mass. Laws 1921, c. 415; for the Act in its present form, see MASS. CUM. 
STAT. (Michie, 1929) c. 123, ? 100 a. 82 S. Glueck, Psychiatric Examination of Persons Accused of Crime (1927) 36 
YALE L. J. 632, 635 n. 7. 83 See the reports of Overholser and S. Glueck, Psychiatry and the Massachu- 
setts Courts as Now Related (1929) 8 SOCIAL FORCES 77, for detailed studies of the 
operation of the law. It is regrettable that no more recent figures are available. 
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for defense, the prosecution, and the courts. Where, however, the re- 
ports of the examiners have been other than "definite psychosis," e.g., 
"mentally defective," "defective delinquent," or "psychopathic person- 
ality," the courts have not generally accepted these classifications as 
requiring special consideration or treatment.84 The literature fails 
to show definitely whether this is due to the state of the law or 
the failure on the part of the courts to cooperate. In the case of 
the psychopathic personalities, the literature implies that the failure to 
treat specially was due in the main to the lack of legislation providing 
for special housing or treatment.85 
The results in the first group must be regarded as admirable when 
compared with the situation in other states where the issues of insanity 
and irresponsibility are fought out at trial. In regard to those cases re- 
ported as mentally disordered to a degree less than "definite psychosis," 
the lawyer can merely point out the difficulties and turn to others for 
help. It is at this point that causation, treatment and law merge. Whether 
it is useful broadly to classify persons as defectives or as psychopaths, 
whether it is sound to conceive of abnormalities of intelligence and per- 
sonality as causative factors of crime instead of regarding each case as 
a unique entity, using statistical conclusions merely as indices of types of 
trouble to look for, etc., are questions that concern primarily those in- 
terested in causation and treatment. It is the function of the law to 
create the machinery by means of which the recommendations of others 
can be carried to successful execution, and to insure cooperation be- 
tween hitherto disparate fields of knowledge. 
The theory of the Massachusetts statute seems fundamentally 
sound. To the extent specified in the statute, it makes an examination 
of mental condition a matter of routine rather than chance. Recogniz- 
ing the evils inherent in allowing laymen to pass on the question of men- 
4 Up to October 15, 1928, 34 of those examined were reported by the Depart- 
ment as "mentally defective" or as "defective delinquents." Eight of these were 
committed by the courts for indeterminate periods to a special institution for this 
type of offender. In the other 26 cases no special disposition was made. In the next 
year, 21 were reported (about two-thirds as many as in the previous 6 years). Of these only 3 were committed to a special institution. The remaining 13 cases 
were disposed of as follows: state prison, 7; reformatory, 2; house of correction, 4; 
filed, nol prossed, not guilty, and probation, one each. 
Similar results have been reached under another Massachusetts statute pro- 
viding for the commitment of certain mental defectives convicted of crime to the 
Department of Mental Delinquents. Mass. Laws 1921, c. 270, as amended, Mass. 
Laws 1928, c. 333. 
Still another Massachusetts statute provides at the request of the trial judge 
for the examination by the Department of Mental Diseases of the mental condition 
of persons coming before the courts. MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 123, ? 99, dis- 
cussed in Overholser, Note on the Massachusetts Statute (1931) 15 BULL. MASS. 
DEP'T OF MENTAL DISEASES, Nos. 3 and 4, at 15. 
85 See Overholser and S. Glueck, supra note 83. 
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tal disorder, it provides for psychiatric examinations in advance and 
the submission of reports to the court and both counsel, in the hope that 
the advice of impartial experts will be followed. It makes possible a 
minimization of the ordinary evils of expert testimony at trial by pro- 
viding for impartial expert testimony in those cases in which pre-trial 
advice is not followed. 
Though the Briggs Law, in theory and practice, is far ahead of any 
other device dealing with the problem of mental disorder and the crim- 
inal law, there are certain adverse criticisms which may be made. 
(1) Routine psychiatric examination applies only to persons in- 
dicted of capital offenses and persons indicted for any offense who have 
been previously convicted of a felony or previously indicted more than 
once. This method of selection seems purely capricious. The classifica- 
tion "felony" is utterly without relevance to the possible existence of 
mental disorder in the offender. Of course it would be impossible and 
unwise to examine all offenders. Some mean must be struck. But it 
is not to be found in a classification historical and outworn. If the as- 
sumption was (at least in part) that society's conception of the serious- 
ness of the offense, as indicated by the severity of the penalty, is a fair 
criterion of the probability that mental disorder exists in the offender, 
this is likewise untenable. 
(2) An analysis of the act in operation shows an amazingly large 
number of cases in which examinations were not made because defend- 
ants had already been sentenced by the courts or were out on bail.86 
This defect may be remedied by requiring as a condition to the imposi- 
tion of sentence or the granting of bail, a report on the mental condition 
of the accused. 
(3) Only 744 cases were reported in seven years. This seems a re- 
markably small number for the entire state. It is true that in the early 
years of the statute the clerks of court were not too assiduous in as- 
certaining the previous record of persons indicted, and that under sub- 
sequent legislation directed to this defect a higher percentage of non- 
capital cases reported has been noted.87 But laxness of officials cannot be 
the entire cause. Unless a centralized system of criminal statistics is 
8 Id. 87 Mass. Laws 1925, c. 169 imposed a fine on delinquent clerks. Probation 
officers were required by Laws 1926, c. 320, ? 2 [MASS. CUM. SUPP. (Michie, 1929) 
c. 276, ? 85] to investigate the records of all persons accused of offenses punishable 
by imprisonment for more than one year, &c. A 1927 amendment to the Briggs 
Law (Acts 1927, c. 59) imposed on probation officers the duty of notifying the 
clerks of previous convictions or indictments, and on clerks the duty of acting on 
such information by reporting it to the Department for Mental Diseases. See 
Overholser, Practical Operation of the Briggs Law (1928) 13 MASS. L. Q. No. 
6, 35. 
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established, at least within the state, the success of the law will remain 
a matter of chance. 
(4) It is apparent from the previous discussion of the Briggs Law, 
that its success demands cooperation on the part of psychiatrists, social 
workers, probation officers, counsel for defense, the prosecution, courts, 
clerks of court, the police, etc. Such cooperation depends on the de- 
gree of centralization subsisting in the administration of criminal jus- 
tice. Until a coordinated system is devised and adopted,88 cooperation 
will remain fortuitous. 
(5) Similarly, the recommendations of psychiatrists will fail of 
execution unless the facilities for treatment along institutional and non- 
institutional lines are kept abreast of psychiatric views. As we have 
seen, the failure of the Massachusetts courts to treat persons reported 
as psychopathic personalities in any but the traditional manner seems to 
be explained by the absence of special institutions. 
(6) The Briggs Law provides that the experts shall determine the 
accused's mental condition "and the existence of any mental disease or 
defect which would affect his criminal responsibility." It has been stated 
by those familiar with the practical operation of the law that the reports 
of the experts leave much to be desired. In most cases the psychiatrists 
have satisfied themselves with a statement that the prisoner is or is not 
"responsible," without making any further description of, or comment 
upon, his mental condition.89 Further, the provision in the statute ask- 
ing (in the conjunctive) for a determination of the existence of any 
mental defect "which would affect" the criminal responsibility of the 
accused, seems to require the determination of a question which is 
foreign to psychiatry. It is not surprising, consequently, if the psy- 
chiatrist's report is less than clear. Of course, a technical description 
of the mental condition of a person is, at best, hardly understandable to 
a layman. But the successful operation of the statute requires that 
psychiatrists couch their reports in terms as simple as possible, includ- 
ing wherever possible a statement as to what may be expected of the 
defendant in the future and what form of treatment would be most de- 
sirable. A statute now authorizes Massachusetts courts to commit per- 
sons certified as defective delinquents to a special institution for an in- 
determinate period.0 The courts should also be empowered by statute 
See Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice (1921) 35 HARV. L. REV. 113. 8 "The psychiatrists of Massachusetts have an unequalled opportunity, by 
means of clearly and simply written reports, giving not only their opinion but some 
of the facts upon which it is grounded, of educating the courts to an appreciation 
of the value of psychiatry as a practical aid in the administration of criminal justice." Overholser, supra note 83. 90 See note 84, supra. 
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to follow the prognostic advice of psychiatrists in any case. This sug- 
gestion indicates how vital is the need for further study and research in 
the field of predictability. 
In conclusion, it may be pointed out that there is no reason for se- 
lecting mental disorder as the sole prerequisite of special treatment. The 
Briggs Law foreshadows a thorough reorganization of our criminal sys- 
tem by which the function of determining the treatment to be accorded 
all offenders would be conferred on a specially qualified tribunal. Such a 
plan would necessitate a splitting of the task now being performed 
mainly by the judicial system into the guilt-finding function on the one 
hand and the treatment function on the other.91 Complete individ- 
ualization of treatment and punishment92 abides the emergence of a 
practicable scheme along these lines. 
L. A. TULIN 
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL 
91 
"The trial ought to be divided into two parts: In the first the examination 
and decision as to . . . guilt should take place; in the second one the punishment 
should be discussed and fixed. From this part the public and the injured party 
should be excluded." 81 ANN. REP. N. Y. PRISON ASS'N (1926) 74. 92 This suggestion has frequently been made. See, e.g., S. Glueck, Principles 
of a Rational Penal Code (1928) 41 HARV. L. REV. 453; Recommendations of the 
Inst. of Crim. Law and Crim. (1919) 10 J. CRIM. L. 184; ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY 
(1929) 804; S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 485; Report of American Psychi- 
atric Ass'n (1928) 19 J. CRIM. L. 367, 373. 
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